Institutional History Databases and Interviews to Ascertain Risks and Health
Concerns Institutional History Databases for the Portsmouth GDP and Paducah GDP were completed using historical documents, the PACE Needs Assessment, and worker comments. Examples from the Institutional History Database for each site are included in Appendix A. The Oak Ridge interview was modified for use at the Portsmouth and Paducah GDP's. 6. Additional Outreach Activities a) The DOE-Lexington Office staff, now responsible for operations at the Portsmouth and Paducah GDP's, and Bechtel-Jacobs representatives at both sites were kept informed and prepared for questions that may come to them as a result of our outreach and medical exam activities. The nickel was first ground to produce a small, uniform feed material. The process occurred in enclosed containers and emissions were subject to filtration before release to the atmosphere. All nickel was run through a large calciner to remove hydrogen fluoride from the scrap before it was fed to the smelter. Particulates and gas from this process were released to a chemical trap system that did not function well. Annual smelter nickel emissions were estimated to be 794 pounds per year.
1986
In September 1986, the C-746A facility was placed in "Standby" As of 2000, the smelter facility still existed, although in a state of disrepair. Contaminated metal igots are stored near the facility, including most of the nickel ingots that were made from the recycle of cascade materials during gaseous diffusion plant improvement programs, Empty casings for nuclear weapon components could be seen above ground behind the smelter facility (414.04, pp. 8-9). Process- Table   From year  To year  Process   1953 In the cascades, UF6 passed through barriers In the converters allowing isotopes of lower molecular weight to pass through resulting in two streams of UF6. The one with a progressively higher percentage U-235 was withdrawn in C-310. Product U-235 (enriched UF6) were withdrawn from the cascade by pumps that discharged through a condenser, piping, and cylinder pigtails to the intended receiving UF6 cylinder. Product cylinders were not supposed to be filled to more than 95 percent (liquid) of capacity. Those that were overfilled were tagged and subject to special handling to resolve the overfilled condition. UF6 cylinders still containing liquid could not be transported around the site without special consideration. Before solid UF6 cylinders were moved to storage, they were "burped" of light gases through sodium fluoride traps. (404.01, p. 16,53)
Building Number: C-310
Contaminations/Incidents

Year Contamination
One report indicated that 20 dpm/m3 from individual puffs based on test run by environmental committee. Maximum allowable is 20 dpm/m3. When there were large spills, the premise was evacuated (414.01, p. F-16) An incident was reported in the C-310 product withdrawal building (C-310A) where an instrument heater control malfunctioned, melted tubing solder, and initiated a significant release that filled C-310 and was working its way across the bridge to C-331. Mechanics were reportedly sent without PPE to shut doors in the bridge. The original instrument line leak was secured by crimping the line by another worker outfitted in a Gra-Lite suit. Reportedly there there was no special monitoring of the involved individuals, and work resumed after the cloud dispersed. (404.01, p. 53)
The beta radiation dose rate at the surface of uranium metal is typically 230 millirems per hour or less. However, when uranium is melted or separated by chemical or physical means, less dense daughter products of uranium, primarily thorium-234 and protactinium-234m, can be concentrated. When the uranium is further processed, significant quantities of these daughter products can remain behind in the form of oxides or ash or on the surface of process vessels. Locations of daughter products at PGDP include C-310 in cylinder heels (feed and withdrawal). The beta radiation dose rate from these daughter products is much higher than that of the original uranium. In addition, these daughter products are loose and easily transferred by contact. Exposure to these daughter products as a result of transfer to clothing, tools, or other items is likely to result in unanticipated beta radiation doses to workers. Protactinium-234m emits a highenergy beta particle, which contributes most of the beta dose from the uranium-238 daughter products (404.01, p. 29)
1953
Based on process chemistry, neptunium and piutonium concentrations would not be increased in the product withdrawal. Identified wipe data with elevated TRU levels confound this conclusion. A former operations supervisor reported that operators turned up "hot" in the product withdrawal area more than any other area of the cascade. Portions of the product withdrawal system operated at approximately 30 psig. As a result, small leaks in this area released enriched process gas into the room atmosphere and provided a higher potential for an intake. Air monitoring sampling indicated moderately high activity readings for the withdrawal room from the time of initial operations up through the early 1960s. 
